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Abstract 
Train passengers experience an interchange between trains in their trip as a nuisance. To model this resistance, a penalty is 
usually added in the calculation of the perceived journey time. For many years, NS and ProRail used a fixed penalty of 10 
minutes per interchange for rail trips in the Netherlands. This penalty was based on expert-judgement. 
A stated preference survey in 2011 [De Keizer et al, 2012, customer resistance to interchanges, ETC Glasgow] demonstrates that 
customers experience a much higher penalty than 10 minutes. The penalty also strongly differs with characteristics of their 
transfer, like transfer time, frequency of the connecting service and whether the transfer is cross platform or not. Recently, the SP 
data have been re-analyzed, based on the recommendations of an audit on the 2011 work. This new analysis shows that a 
reference penalty is 23 minutes (including 2 minutes transfer time), which is more than twice as high as the current value. 
However, under certain optimal circumstances, the penalty can be lower than 14 minutes. Comparing the findings with earlier 
results and findings from international literature shows a similar dependence between punctuality, the connection time and the 
frequency of the connecting train in all studies. The added value of the new survey is a more detailed analysis of the importance 
of the various aspects of interchanges between trains. The outcomes of the new analysis have been compared with real-world 
data. This comparison showed that using the new values led to a much better fit with reality.  For example, growth rates of 
various direct connections to Schiphol Airport were 30-100% higher in reality than had been predicted  with the fixed 10 minutes 
penalty . Applying the new differentiated penalty led to a forecast with a maximum deviation of only 15% compared with the 
real-world figures.  
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1. Introduction 
Train passengers experience an interchange between trains as a nuisance. To model this resistance, a penalty is 
usually added in the calculation of the perceived journey time. For many years a fixed penalty of 10 minutes per 
interchange was used for rail trips in the Netherlands. This penalty was based on expert-judgment. 
A stated preference survey conducted by NS in 2011 [De Keizer et al, 2012] demonstrated that customers 
experience a penalty which is much higher than 10 minutes.  The penalty also strongly varies with characteristics of 
the transfer, such as transfer time, frequency of the connecting service and whether the transfer is cross platform or 
not. In the Netherlands NS, the operator of the core rail service (whose market share in Passenger-Rail-Kilometres is 
app. 90%), and ProRail, the infrastructure provider, work closely together in improving the quality of the timetable. 
Because of this common interest, NS and ProRail decided to use these new insights for future timetable 
development. Before that, Steer Davies Gleave (SDG) was commissioned to conduct an audit on the study and 
Significance was asked to improve the model estimations following the recommendations of SDG. 
This paper discusses the re-analysis and compares the findings with earlier results and findings from international 
literature. It also shows the comparison between the model outcomes with the real-world observations and discusses 
its application in demand forecasting models. 
2. Discussion of re-analysis 
The 2011 SP survey contained two experiments. In the first, respondents were asked to choose between two travel 
alternatives. Both with one interchange but different characteristics of the interchange. Each alternative was 
described by its travel time, the transfer time and the type of interchange (cross-platform, cross-station with 
escalators, cross-station without escalators). In the second experiment, the number of interchanges between the 
alternatives varied from 0 to 2 interchanges. The alternatives were described by travel time, transfer time, number of 
interchanges, possible additional waiting time when missing a connection and cost of the trip. The type of 
interchange was not presented in the second experiment. 
We estimated utility functions to model the choices of the respondents (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Data from 
both experiments were pooled using appropriate scale factors.  
We assumed a linear disutility for travel time, travel cost and possible additional waiting time. For the number of 
interchanges and the type of interchange, we estimated constant disutility factors. For the transfer time, a linear 
utility term did not fit the data. A transfer time of 5 minutes was clearly preferred above a shorter transfer time (2 
minutes) or a longer transfer time (8 minutes or higher), so a 5-minute interchange is viewed as optimal by the 
respondents (Figure 1). Therefore, we assumed a linear declining disutility function for interchanges between 2 and 
5 minutes, and an increasing disutility for transfer times above 5 minutes. 
We estimated separate utility functions for three travel purposes: commuting & business, education and other. A 
general-purpose model was estimated on data from all respondents, using weight factors to correct for an unbalance 
in the distribution over the purposes in the sample. Error margins were corrected for the panel structure of the data 
(using a Jackknife procedure, see Miller 1974). Final results are presented in Table 1. All estimated coefficients are 
divided by the travel time coefficient, so that they can be presented in equivalent travel time minutes. 
From these modelling results, we draw the following conclusions: 
x The value of travel time is 6.77 minutes per euro, or 8.86 euro per hour. This is consistent with 9.25 euro per 
hour, which is the official value from a nation-wide value-of-travel-time survey in the Netherlands (Significance 
et al. 2012; Kouwenhoven et al. 2014).  
x The value of one minute transfer time (above 5 minutes) is equivalent to 1.67 minutes of travel time. This is 
nicely within the range of 1.2 – 2.5 minutes for interchange multiplier factors used in other countries (Wardman 
2014). The optimal transfer time is 5 minutes, as can be seen from Figure 1. 
x Travelers have a strong preference for a trip without interchanges. A direct connection is valued at 22.63 minutes 
less compared to a connection with one interchange but otherwise similar characteristics. It should be noted that 
we assume this interchange to be cross-platform with a transfer time of 2 minutes and a possible extra waiting 
time of 15 minutes (when the connecting train is missed due to delays).  
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x Different interchange characteristics will result in a different valuation: the value of a direct connection compared 
to a trip with one interchange with 5 minutes transfer time and 10 minutes possible extra waiting time is only 
13.36 minutes. 
x One minute of possible additional waiting time is valued at 0.72 minutes of travel time, which seems reasonable. 
x A cross-station interchange is valued at an equivalent of 7.22 minutes travel time increase compared to a cross-
platform interchange. No significant difference was found between a cross-station interchange with and without 
escalators. A more precise analysis revealed that the penalty is about 6.4 minutes for people travelling without 
luggage or with only a small bag, and 13 minutes for people travelling with heavy luggage. 
Table 1: Final model results and t-ratios. All model coefficients are expressed in equivalent travel time minutes. Note that the uncertainties in the 
interchange coefficients should be doubled (i.e. t-ratios should be halved) due to unclear specification of the SP, see text. 
Purpose: ALL COMM./BUS. OTHER EDUCATION 
(In equivalent travel time) Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
TRAVEL COST         
For each Euro  6.77 (10.8) 3.83 (7.8) 11.95 (10.9) 7.64 (3.2) 
TRANSFER TIME         
Transfer time = 2 minutes 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) 
For each minute between 2 – 5 min. -1.89 (-4.4) -0.77 (-2.5) -4.43 (-6.6) -1.85 (-1.3) 
For each minute above 5 minutes 1.67 (9.1) 1.68 (12.9) 1.29 (5.1) 1.74 (2.9) 
NUMBER OF INTERCHANGES         
0 * -22.63 (-10.2) -18.88 (-9.6) -31.13 (-9.5) -20.07 (-3.6) 
1 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) 
2 * 15.62 (10.7) 13.60 (10.7) 21.15 (10.0) 14.47 (3.7) 
POSSIBLE EXTRA WAITING TIME         
Possible waiting time = 15 minutes 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) 
For each minute different from 15 min. 0.72 (7.3) 0.59 (7.2) 1.03 (7.6) 0.58 (2.1) 
TYPE OF INTERCHANGE         
Cross-platform 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) 0 (-) 
Cross-station 7.22 (6.4) 5.31 (7.4) 11.86 (7.4) 7.48 (1.9) 
 
Compared to the previous analysis (De Keizer et al. 2012) we have combined the data from the two experiments 
in a different way: amongst others, we used a uniform base level for a single interchange. Previously, the travel time 
coefficient depended on the trip duration but the evidence for this in the data was not convincing. We included in 
our final model only coefficients that are significant and are relevant for the implementation (see next section), all 
other coefficients have been removed. These changes were made following the recommendations from the external 
auditor (Steer Davies Gleave).  
Furthermore, we looked into the uncertainties of the final estimated coefficients. On top of the estimation error 
margins, we believed that the uncertainty in the transfer penalties should be doubled since some of the attributes in 
the SP were not clearly specified. Specifically, in the second experiment, it was not specified whether the 
interchange was cross-platform, or cross-station. 
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Fig. 1: Additional penalty for an interchange with a transfer time of more than 2 minutes 
3. Recommended values for interchange penalties 
Table 2 summarizes the set of interchange penalties in the perceived journey time. The interchange penalty has 
been constructed for an arbitrarily chosen case: 
1. Cross-platform interchange 
2. Transfer time of 2 minutes 
3. “Possible additional waiting time by missing the interchange” of 15 minutes 
4. Travelling with ‘average’ luggage 
 
For this situation, the transfer penalty is equal to 23 minutes (including 2 minutes transfer time). For other 
situations, the penalty can be calculated by comparing its characteristics with these above. For every deviation of the 
characteristics a supplement or reduction on the value of the interchange penalty is made (see table 2). The starting 
value plus or minus the values of the deviations make the complete interchange penalty. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the transfer time and the additional penalty for a transfer time of more 
than 2 minutes. The negative values between 2 and 8.5 minutes transfer time mean that the interchange penalty in 
this range is lower than for an interchange with a transfer time of 2 minutes. From a customer’s point of view the 
optimal transfer time is 5 minutes. 
Table 2: recommended values for interchange penalties 
Resistance factor Perceived journey time by trip 
purpose (minutes) 
Interchange penalty (transfer time included) for a cross platform interchange with a 
transfer time of 2 minutes and a possible additional waiting time of 15 minutes 
23 
 
Cross-station interchange (instead of cross-platform) + 7 
Travelling with heavy luggage + 7 
Travelling with no luggage / only light luggage -1 
Transfer time See figure 1 
Possible additional waiting time by missing an interchange See table 3 
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Although the model estimation did not result in a dependency because of the lack of longer transfer times in the 
SP design, it is very likely that the resistance for the possible additional waiting time  depends on the planned 
transfer time of the interchange. After all, the likelihood of missing the connection decreases by the increase of the 
planned transfer time. Based on expert-judgment of NS and ProRail experts a dependence between the two 
resistance factors has been implemented in the application model: the resistance for possible additional waiting time 
is constant up to 8 minutes and decreases to zero between 8 and 15 minutes transfer time as is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Dependency between ‘Possible additional waiting time’- penalty and the transfer time 
‘Possible additional waiting time’- penalty per minute Transfer time (minutes) 
0,72 <= 8 
0,72 * (15 – Transfer time) / 7 Between 8 and 15 
0 >= 15 
4. Comparison of the findings with international literature 
We did not find any literature with a similar detailed analysis of the importance of various aspects of 
interchanges between trains. However, the average height of the new penalty seems to be in the range of 
international findings. In general, the new value corresponds better with the results from other studies than the 
previously used fixed value of 10 minutes penalty (excluding transfer time). 
In the Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook (PDFH) the interchange penalties are split by distance band and 
ticket type. An interchange in a trip with a distance of 25 km has a penalty of 15 minutes for full fare and reduced 
tickets and a penalty of 10 minutes for season tickets. For a distance of 160 km it increases to 40 minutes for full 
fare and reduced tickets and 26 minutes for seasonal tickets. The transfer time has been excluded from these 
numbers. The range between 10 and 40 minutes is in line with the range in our study: quite common values are 
between 8 and 35 minutes. The difference between the ticket types full fare/reduced and seasonal is largely 
consistent with the difference in trip purposes social-recreational and commuting.  
In a research of MVA (1985) a cross-station interchange (instead of cross-platform) was valued at 9 minutes. 
That’s comparable to the 7 minutes extra penalty for cross-station penalties in this study.  
In Wardman, M., & Hine, J. (2000) several studies are mentioned about the impact of a guaranteed connection on 
the interchange penalty. A MVA study (1987) of the Network South East suburban services shows an interchange 
penalty of 13 minutes if the connection is guaranteed. If it is not guaranteed the penalty increases to 20 minutes if 
there was a chance of 10% of being delayed 5 minutes and it increases to 39 minutes if there was a chance of 10% to 
being delayed 30 minutes. TCI-OR (1996) found that a guaranteed connection was worth 20 minutes of journey 
time. In the present study delays and guaranteed connections are not presented directly to the respondents. In the 
experiments, respondents only got information about the frequency of the connecting service. The results showed 
that with a lower frequency of a connecting train, passengers experience a greater interchange resistance, because of 
the possible extra waiting time in case of missing the connection (see table 1 and 2). Dependence between 
punctuality, the connection time and the frequency of the connecting train is confirmed in all studies. 
5. Comparison of the findings with real-world observations 
We have studied three real cases in which direct services are replaced by services with an interchange and vice 
versa. We looked at the number of travelers between two stations, and corrected for effects of economic and 
demographic growth etc. The remaining change in number of travelers is attributed to the change in Generalized 
Journey Time (GJT). 
We included the results of our new study in the GJT-calculation. By multiplying the different GJT-outcomes 
through the years with a journey time elasticity, a prediction of the growth caused by GJT changes can be made. The 
same can be done for a GJT-calculation with the old 10 minutes interchange penalty. 
The three cases are the following ones.  
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Schiphol – Ede-W/Arnhem/Nijmegen 
The completion of the ‘Utrechtboog’ near the Amsterdam ArenA soccer stadium has resulted in a direct 
service between Schiphol and Ede-W/Arnhem/Nijmegen in 2009. Before then, this trip could only be made with 
an interchange. The passenger growth caused by GJT-reduction on these relations is 23% (see Figure 2), which 
is twice as large as expected based on the old transfer penalty. Using the results of the new study, the GJT 
model predicts a growth of 21% which is much more in line with the real-world observation. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Development of the number of trips on the relation Schiphol-Ede-W/Arnhem/Nijmegen. Comparison of calculated growth when applying 
new penalty (study outcome), old penalty (10 minutes) and real-world observation 
Schiphol-Purmerend/Hoorn 
In 2004 the ‘Hemboog’ near Amsterdam Sloterdijk was the trigger for starting up the direct service between 
Schiphol and Purmerend and Hoorn. A large growth in the ridership was observed. Again, this could not be 
explained by the GJT improvement using the old value of interchange (Figure 3). Application of the new values 
results in a much better correspondence between the GJT model and the actual growth.  
 
 
Fig. 3: Development of the number of trips on the relation Schiphol-Purmerend/Hoorn. Comparison of calculated growth when applying 
new penalty (study outcome), old penalty (10 minutes) and real-world observation 
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Den Haag Centraal - Arnhem 
In another case (see figure 4) it has been decided to remove a direct service in favor of another connection. 
In 2009 the intercity-service between Den Haag and Arnhem has been shortened to Den Haag Centraal – 
Utrecht Centraal.  From then onwards, travelers between Den Haag and Arnhem had to change trains in 
Utrecht. The drop in the number of passengers caused by a GJT-increase on this relation has been three to four 
times higher than expected before. If the same calculation is made by using the study results a small 
underestimation remains but the result is much more appropriate to the real-world observation than before. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Development of the number of trips on the relation Den Haag Centraal - Arnhem. Comparison of calculated growth when applying new 
penalty (study outcome), old penalty (10 minutes) and real-world observation 
6. Conclusions 
The outcome of this new analysis is a reference interchange penalty, that is twice as high as the old penalty. The 
analysis also shows large differences in the height of the penalty depending on the characteristics of the interchange 
(cross-platform, frequency of trains, waiting time etc.). For the first time, this study investigates many interchange 
characteristics (including their weights) together. The comparison with the real-world observations shows that the 
new estimated values fit better than the old ones.  
It can be concluded that in public transport studies a variable interchange penalty, that takes into account the 
different characteristics of each interchange, is necessary to make a good forecast of travelers behavior and 
passenger growth.  
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